Philosophy and Literature Blog

Scanlon is dilating on the notion of  'reasons to act' and whether one can be right or wrong about such things. As a mathematician I really liked this great paragraph where he describes mathematical reasoning as not about oneself, something one can be right or wrong about, but not being outside the self. That way, we are not committed to Platonism. A very nice summary of this position.  Can reasons for action be the same way? Can we be incorrect? If so, how can we know we are incorrect? Is there a logic underlying reasons for action that is close enough in analogy to math that we should at least not dismiss? It does seem that we have a kind of Kantian thing going on here -- adoption of rationality in some form as a way to decide about action. I have to admit I am attracted to this general philosophy. Look, you can say 'why should I be reasonable anyway?' and I don't have a good answer. But, being reasonable has helped me in so much of my life, perhaps I sho

Over the last year I have gotten more heavily into reading moral philosophy. As a result, some of my long-held views have been significantly challenged -- most especially my Nietzschean or nihilist intuitions have been challenged. Thus I have to admit that in the past I have not given sufficient attention to certain other views, especially more contemporary views, including, perhaps, though I need to read him more thoroughly to know for sure, the views of Derek Parfit. But, before I haul off and read thousands of pages of Parfit, I will start by looking at this book by Scanlon, which I am just now reading. But first, I'm going to describe the main consideration that has made me re-think things. It all started with Kant. I listened to the Critique of Practical Reason on audiobook -- my eyes are such that physically reading is difficult, though there is no audiobook of Scanlon that I know of. The basic point is, do I have a reason to be rational in my moral behavior? If not, then s