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Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Entry 8, "The king without a sword, the land without a king"

"The word 'Excalibur', say, is a proper name in the ordinary sense. The sword Excalibur consists of parts combined in a particular way. If they are combined differently Excalibur does not exist. But it is clear that "Excalibur has a sharp blade" makes sense whether Excalibur is still whole or is broken up. But if "Excalibur" is the name of an object, this object no longer exists when Excalibur is broken in pieces; and as no object would then correspond to the name it would have no meaning. But then the sentence "Excalibur has a sharp  blade" would contain a word that had no meaning, and hence the sentence would be nonsense. But it does make sense; so there must always be something corresponding to the words of which it consists. So the word "Excalibur" must disappear when the sense is analyzed and its place be taken by words which name simples. It will be reasonable to call these words the real names." (Wittgenstein, section 39)

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Enty 7, the problems of ostensive definitions

    After I got my undergrad in philosophy I spent the summer working on a horse farm -- I was part of the 'maintenance' team, they didn't let me near the horses!  -- and I had this boss who would bark commands at me like "Go over there get that thing and take it over there!" while pointing in arbitrary directions. He would get madder and madder as I didn't perform whatever task he had in mind. This, combined with me constantly wrecking his utility truck, backing tractors into it, running it into gates and so on, made for a long summer. One thing's for sure, I never mastered whatever the language game was, but at least I had the good sense not to mention Wittgenstein.      The point is, when someone points at something by way of definition, the person being shown whatever it is has to know what is being pointed at: a shape, a color, and object, a number or whatever. How is it that the learner knows what specifically is being pointed at? How does the teach

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Entry 6, transformations and solipsism

     "If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games in view you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions like: "What is a question?" -- Is it the statement that I do not know such-and-such, or the statement that I with the other person would tell me....? Or is it the description of my mental state of uncertainty? -- And is the cry "Help!" such a description?"(Wittgenstein, pg. 10) I'm going to try to think this out -- feel free to help me here. So, it seems to me that he is saying something like: when we forget there are all these different games with their own purview, we start puzzling over meta-problems, asking self-referential questions or making self-referential statements. This is a take on why self-referential statements should be avoided: it is not to avoid paradoxes, per say, but because they betray a forgetting that language is actually a collection of games. Paradoxes are a hazard of this forgetting.      "The significance o

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Entry 5, you are what you play

     If we follow through on what Wittgenstein is saying, we get some more multi-culti inferences. Rather than consciousness having a universal character, if there are all these language games, and these games define how you interact with yourself and the world, then consciousness is relative to the games you are playing. This is culturally relative and changes over time in your own life as you play different games.      Augustine's theory of language has a naughty youngster using language to get what he wants prior to the game. With Wittgenstein's view, the point may be that the game defines what is wantable; there is no primordial want.      All of this is, you know, hackneyed or whatever by now, but that's where I think this is going. Now, I also think there's a fundamental way in which this has to be wrong.  I have a strong feeling that there are meta-rules out there, determined by our DNA, that determine the set of possible games. But I know better than to think

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Entry 4, Language Games and Forms of Life

     In paragraph 23 Wittgenstein lists a number of language games: "Giving orders, and obeying them-- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements-- Constructing an object from a description(a drawing)-- Reporting and event-- Speculating about an event-- Forming and testing a hypothesis-- Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams-- Making up a story; and reading it-- Play-acting-- Singing catches-- Guessing riddles-- Making a joke; telling it-- Solving a problem in practical arithmetic-- Translating from one language to another-- Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying."(Wittgenstein pg. 11)      I take it this list is not supposed to be exhaustive. Wittgenstein associates a 'Form of Life', a Lebensform, with each language-game. So, what's a Lebensform? Well, its a way of interacting with other people and the world, I guess. I suppose this is a good word for it. Rather than a single way of deali

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Entry 3, Philosophy and Language

     The first 20 paragraphs are broad reflections on the nature of language itself, how it is learned, the uses to which it is put etc... Wittgenstein begins with a quotation from Augustine's Confessions about how he learned language by imitating what adults said. I always feel, even reading this passage, that somehow Augustine is being naughty, seeking advantage, being a little rascal by imitating adults to get what he wants, but maybe that's just me projecting my own guilt. Another thing I can't help mentioning is the influence of Chomsky, that language acquisition involves much more than mere imitation, there's complicated structures under the hood -- this seems much less naughty.      One might be tempted to ask: "why the obsession with linguistics, isn't that a science now?" So, I should say some things about the relationship between our theories regarding language and the problems of philosophy. Philosophy has these 'problems': what's

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Entry 2, The Preface

     As some of you know, the title of the Tractatus was suggested by G.E. Moore as a reference to Spinoza's Tractatus, a work that proved the impossibility of miracles. Wittgenstein's Tractatus reads like one of the hyper-geometric set of axioms a-la the Ethics, with lots of numbers and sections, giving it the sense of a long proof, though whether or not it was meant to be one is at least questionable.     Unlike the Tractatus, the Investigations is a set of sentences, paragraphs, numbered, perhaps reminiscent of Nietzsche's  aphorisms, though much more explicated and logical. As Wittgenstein opens the Preface: "The thoughts which I publish in what follows are the precipitate of philosophical investigations which have occupied me for the last sixteen years. They concern many subjects: the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things." He laments that he was unable t

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, entry 1

      I've been thinking for some time about starting a, probably very, very long, series of entries on the Philosophical Investigations. Now, I am NOT an expert on Wittgenstein. I've read the Tractatus and Blue and Brown Books, but it's been a while. Of course, if someone who knows about Wittgenstein wants to opine about how I'm wrong, please do so.       Wittgenstein is obviously a fascinating figure: I remember being intrigued by him when I was a teenager reading accounts of his personality by Russell. He seemed an wild foil to Russell's self-control -- it was later I read about Russell's letters with D.H. Lawrence.       Be prepared for idiosyncratic digressions. I'll start now...      A few years ago I read a book called Naming Infinity, by Graham and Kantor. This book is about the development of modern analysis in France and Russia, with an emphasis on the mystical devotion of Luzin,  Egorov and Florensky. The notion that to name something is to cr